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Thinking – an anthropological difference?  
Against Davidson on thought and language 
 
 
Some people, especially philosophers, think that one of the most important anthropological 
differences is the capacity to think. Thinking, they claim, is a property which distinguishes 
human beings from all other creatures.  
However, in arguing for this anthropological difference it is of course insufficient simply to 
assert its existence. What is needed, is recourse to a second property, one that fulfils at least 
two conditions: on the one hand only human beings should have it, and on the other hand this 
property must be necessary for cognitive capacities. Many people, and not only philosophers, 
think that speaking a language would be such a property. One such is Donald Davidson. He 
provided three arguments for the thesis that only linguistic creatures think. They might be 
called: the argument from holism, the argument from intensionality, and the argument from 
the concept of belief. Both the argument from holism and the argument from intensionality 
are mainly concerned with the difficulties one faces in trying to find out the content of the 
beliefs a non-linguistic being might have. Now, difficulties are not impossibilities. Thus, 
neither the argument from holism nor the argument from intensionality yield an objection in 
principle to the thesis that there can be thought without language. However, it is claimed that 
the argument from the concept of belief provides such an objection in principle. It is 
Davidson’s primary argument for language being essential to thought, for it proceeds through 
reflection on what is required to have beliefs at all. In short, the argument from the concept of 
belief aims at showing that to have beliefs a creature must have the concept of belief and, in 
turn, the concepts of truth, error and objectivity. This, however, requires language.  
Now, if it were possible to challenge especially this argument from the concept of belief one 
would gain evidence for two assumptions: first, even creatures unable to speak a language can 
think; and second, the capacity to think does not constitute an anthropological difference. 
And, indeed, the argument from the concept of belief has been challenged very often. 
Therefore, it seems there is hope that non-linguistic creatures be sapient beings. However, 
many of these objections cannot prove Davidson's argument wrong, for the simple reason that 
the nature of the argument from the concept of belief is not taken seriously. Thus, one can 
find counterarguments, such as arguments from analogy to the effect that some of the things 
non-linguistic animals do are done in exactly the same way we human beings would do them, 
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were we in their place. And since our actions are explained by reference to intentions or 
thought in general, their actions could be explained in this manner just as well.1  
Yet, while in many cases perfectly valid, arguments from analogy cannot prove Davidson 
wrong. For his interest is in conceptual matters. He is concerned with the conditions which are 
essential for thought. Thus, creatures that do not fulfill those conditions, that is, creatures that 
lack a language, cannot be credited with thought on the basis of behavioral similarities to 
linguistic creatures. For given a conceptual connection between thought and its essential 
conditions lacking these conditions amounts to not having thoughts at all, regardless of how 
strong the behavioral similarities might be. Arguments from analogy miss this point.  
However, arguments from analogy can be helpful, if only at the second step. If it were 
possible to prove Davidson’s conceptual point wrong or to show that in effect not all of his 
points are conceptual, one would gain support for the thesis that thought is not necessarily 
connected to the ability of speaking a language. This, in turn, would allow us to press the 
analogy with the explanation of human action.  
Thus, first of all, Davidson's argument from the concept of belief for language being essential 
to thought has to be challenged directly. This too, however, has already been done several 
times. There are three main direct objections raised: the first objection holds that the argument 
from the concept of belief amounts to a vicious circle; according to the second, Davidson 
engages in empirical speculations which provide too weak a basis for his modal claim; and the 
third objection aims at offering an empirical counterargument.  
Whether these objections are successful and amount to a refutation of the argument from the 
concept of belief shall be the subject of this paper. Thus, I shall do three things. First I shall 
present Davidson’s argument from the concept of belief; afterwards I shall present and 
evaluate the three direct objections raised against it. By way of conclusion, I shall discuss 
whether these objections suffice to prove Davidson's general claim that language is essential 
to thought wrong, and then outline some possible consequences for the cognitive status of 
non-linguistic creatures and for the question whether the capacity to think might be a 
candidate for an anthropological difference.  
In his later writings Davidson embedded the argument from the concept of belief in the 
scenario of triangulation. This scenario, he holds, is a condition for the possibility of the 
account for two aspects of thought, namely “the objectivity of thought and the empirical 
content of thoughts about the external world.” (2001 (1997): 129) In order to have objective 
thoughts with determinate empirical content, a creature must stand in relations of interaction 
                                                
1 H.-J. Glock, 2008,  
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with both objects and events in the world and with at least one creature sufficiently like itself, 
thereby forming a triangle with the other creature, the object or event, and itself as corners. 
Now, why should this triangle account for both the objectivity of thought and its empirical 
content? And how does language come into play here?  
In terms of content determination first of all, Davidson is a perceptual externalist. In basic 
cases, he argues, the content of perceptual beliefs is what typically causes them. The problem, 
however, lies precisely in the determination of this typical cause. For there are usually chains 
of causes leading to a belief. Thus, the question is where to locate the content-giving cause in 
these chains. And what is more, the cause’s type has to be determined as well.  
After all, what seems to be clear is, only to look at objects on a causal chain leading to a 
creature’s belief does not amount to a determination of the content of its belief. We need to 
take into account the creature’s reactions, as well. “Since any set of causes whatsoever will 
have endless properties in common, we must look to some recurrent feature of the gatherer, 
some mark that he or she has classified cases as similar. This can only be some aspect of the 
gatherer’s reactions.” (Externalisms: 4f.) They have to be similar in order to determine what 
this creature finds to be similar, that is, what it reacts to. But the question remains: similar in 
what respect? For, of course, the creature’s reactions are similar in endless respects. This 
question, Davidson argues, has no answer when there is only one creature. “The problem is 
not, I should stress, one of verifying what objects or events a creature is responding to; the 
point is that without a second creature responding to the first, there can be no answer to the 
question.” (2001 (1992): 119) A second creature is needed, one sufficiently like the first. It 
has to react to the reactions of the first creature and find them – and their causes – similar. 
Thereby it can determine the content-giving stimulus. It is the nearest mutual cause.  
As a matter of fact, triangulation as so far described is not very social. It seems sufficient to 
have a creature observing another and thereby determining the content of the other creature’s 
thought. But this restriction of the social aspect is problematic. For, on this level, we have the 
situation of radical interpretation. Here, a radical interpreter tries to assign truth conditions to 
the sentences of a radically foreign language on the basis of observable circumstances and 
correlated sentences held true by a speaker. The object of the speaker’s belief, then, is 
determined by the interpreter’s taking the speaker “to be responding to the same features of 
the world that he would be responding to under similar circumstances.” (2001 (1991): 211) 
The problem in our case is that the method of radical interpretation shows at most that if the 
first creature, that is the speaker, has thoughts, then the second creature, the observer or 
radical interpreter, can determine the relevant reactions and causes. After all, the presence or 
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absence of an observer should not make a difference to the state the observed creature is in.2 
The same holds for the content-determining correlations. They are there whether or not a 
second creature is watching.  
And there is another problem: If what a creature finds similar is determined by an observer’s 
finding its reactions and causes similar, we run into an infinite regress. For, of course, a 
standard of similarity is needed for the reactions of the observer as well, to be provided by a 
third creature observing the second, and so on.  
The solution to both problems, Davidson argues, lies in the interaction of two creatures. They 
must observe each other and thereby determine the causes and reactions of the other as 
similar. That is, the interaction has to matter to the creatures involved. It has to be made 
available to them. Thus, both creatures must have knowledge of the triangular situation of 
which they are part. They must know that the object of their respective reactions is common 
to both, and they must know that they both know this. 
Content-determination, then, consists in mutual knowledge of an object as the object of 
thought of an observed creature in a triangular situation. Yet this mutual knowledge does not 
emerge from silent observation. The only way it emerges, Davidson holds, is from 
communication. “For two people to know of each other that they are so related, that their 
thoughts are so related, requires that they be in communication. Each of them must speak to 
the other and be understood by the other.” (2001 (1992): 121) It should be clear that mutual 
knowledge of this triangular situation is nothing but a belief about beliefs. Thus, mutual 
knowledge of the triangle consists in having the concept of belief. And having the concept of 
belief requires, as we have seen, communication; that is, it requires language.  
So far the role of both language and the concept of belief for the determination of the content 
of belief: Now, why should triangulation also account for the objectivity of thought? This is 
so, Davidson argues, because “thought, propositional thought, is objective in the sense that it 
has content which is true or false independent of the existence of the thought or the thinker. 
Furthermore, this is a fact of which a thinker must be aware.” (2001 (1997): 129) Thus, the 
claim is that unless one has the concept of belief and knows that beliefs are things with 
independently existing truth conditions – that is, unless one has the concept of objective truth 
– one cannot have beliefs at all. The concept of truth is necessary for there to be thought at all. 
Possessing the concept of truth, however, is possible only through triangulation. For, with one 
creature alone there can be no answer to the question which of its reactions might be 
mistaken. Only the triangular situation makes room for deviance, and therefore, for possible 
                                                
2 See, Glüer 1999: 74; Glüer 2006: 1010; Pagin 2001: 203 
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mistake. However, this is not to say, Davidson holds, that triangulation suggests where the 
norm for the determination of possible mistakes lies. “The point is not to identify the norm, 
but to make sense of there being a norm.” (2001: 7) And we can make sense of there being a 
norm only through the determination of an independent object of thought. But this, as we have 
seen, is possible only through communication.  
Thus, the concepts of belief and of objective truth are necessary conditions of thought. Their 
possession, however, is possible only through communication in a triangular situation.  
As was said at the beginning, there are three main objections directly raised against 
Davidson’s argument: the first objection holds that Davidson’s argument amounts to a vicious 
circle; according to the second Davidson engages in empirical speculations that do not support 
his modal claim; and the third objection aims at providing an empirical counterargument. 
Let’s have a look at the objection from circularity, first. It claims that in his triangulation-
argument from the necessity of language for thought Davidson engages with conceptual 
capacities from the very beginning. He thus presupposes what should be the result of his 
analysis.3 Prima facie this objection seems obvious. For, as we have seen, it is language that 
explains how there could be objective thought with content in the first place. And Davidson 
even admits this. To the question of what is needed when mere reactions should amount to 
thought, he replies: “I think the answer is language.” (2001 (1997): 130) Yet, its obvious 
character notwithstanding, there are two good responses to this objection. First, not in all 
triangular situations there are conceptual capacities involved. Triangulation can take place on 
different levels. On the lowest level the threefold interaction of two creatures and a common 
object in the world is wired in, as is the case for instance in a school of fish. (2001 (1997): 
128) On higher levels the creatures learn to simultaneously interact with each other and with 
an object or event in their world. Davidson`s example is vervet monkeys using one of three 
different alarm calls. (ibid.) Only with the interaction involving thought language comes into 
play.  
But isn’t this circular all the same? After all, the fact obviously remains, only the possession 
of the concepts of belief and truth and therefore only the possession of language is supposed 
to explain belief.  
The explanation is circular, indeed. But, as Davidson rightly holds, this is no avoidable defect. 
For, unless intentional concepts can be reduced to something else the explanation of 
intentional phenomena like belief-possession has to make use of intentional vocabulary. This, 
in turn, leaves us with the triviality that you cannot have thoughts without having thoughts. 
                                                
3 See, Lepore and Ludwig 2005: 407 p.; Glüer 2006: 1013; Pagin 2001: 205. 
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Thus, the second response to the charge of circularity is: “the concept of thought is not 
reducible to anything else.” (2001 (1992): 120)  
Now, do these responses together reveal the charge of circularity to be harmless? In my 
opinion, they do. If one is an anti-reductionist, which I think is a good thing to be, then, an 
explanation of intentional phenomena stated in purely extensional terms can only consist in a 
list of necessary conditions. Adding a sufficient condition will inevitably make use of 
intentional vocabulary and thus be on exactly the level one’s argument is supposed to account 
for.  
But what about the support of the necessity of particular conditions for having thought? Most 
importantly, what about the necessity of the second person? Isn’t it supported by conditions 
that are already sufficient, namely by the attribution of thoughts to both creatures from the 
very beginning? And if so, doesn’t this finally amount to a circle that is vicious all the same? 
This at least is claimed, notably by Glüer and Pagin.4 Their argument is as follows: 
As we have seen, triangulation can take place on several levels. It happens in cases of learned 
animal signaling as well as in cases of wired-in, three place interactions between two 
creatures and objects in their world. On these levels, or at least on the level of wired-in 
interactions, many would grant Davidson the absence of intentional states such as beliefs. So 
it seems there is a non-circular argument. For, as Davidson insists, here as well, more than 
one creature is needed to determine the object of non-cognitive reactions. (2001 (1997): 128) 
However, there is the following problem. If there is, as Davidson claims, an irreducible gap 
between non-cognitive reactions and those guided by thought, “why would what is necessary 
for (the former) to have determinate objects also be necessary for propositional thought?”5 On 
the assumption of anti-reductionism, Glüer and Pagin hold that there simply is no relation 
between the cognitive and the non-cognitive realm that would warrant such a conclusion. Of 
course, there is evolutionary evidence that monkeys are on an earlier stage than we human 
beings. But, even if we grant that they are not sapient beings, reference to evolution in this 
case would be of no help for Davidson. For, his is a conceptual matter. The modal force 
provided by arguments from evolutionary history, therefore, is not strong enough for his 
concerns.  
As matters stand, Davidson does not provide a non-circular reason for the presence of the 
second person. For, the only plausible way of understanding its necessity is by attributing 
thoughts to the persons from the very beginning. What Davidson does, then, is ascribe 
thoughts to talking persons. And this, Pagin and Glüer hold, is trivially correct. And of course 
                                                
4 Glüer 1999, Glüer 2006, Pagin 2001, see also Talmage 1997, Verheggen 1997 
5 Glüer 2006: 1015. 
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talking about an object observed by two persons also requires this object to be located at an 
intersection of causal lines leading from each of the two to this object. But, as Pagin holds, 
“this does not begin to indicate that the intersecting itself is needed for providing an answer to 
the question what it is that either of us is observing.”6 The necessity of the second person is 
only shown for situations in which there is already thought. This, however, leaves open the 
possibility of content-determination of thought performed by a creature on its own. Therefore, 
it leaves open the possibility of non-linguistic creatures having thoughts. 
Although prima facie plausible, Glüer`s and Pagin`s argument, it seems to me, is 
unconvincing, for a simple reason: Glüer and Pagin both miss the point of anti-reductionism. 
They want to have one’s cake and eat it, too. For, on the one hand Pagin, at least, explicitly 
takes the side of anti-reductionism. (“XXXXX”) But on the other hand he is not prepared to 
accept its consequences. And one of the important consequences of anti-reductionism – or, to 
put it in other terms, of the explanatory circle of intentionality – is that, although there can be 
support of extensionally stated necessary conditions for thought that is itself extensionally 
stated, the final support of those necessary conditions will consist in a sufficient condition – 
that is, in a condition couched in intentional terms. For if thought is not reducible to anything 
else an explanation of this phenomenon, even one that uses non-intentionally stated conditions 
as support, has to make use of intentional vocabulary. That is, it has to refer to the 
phenomenon to be explained. And there is even more to it, namely: that extensionally stated 
arguments – such as those referring to evolutionary history or to the presence of a second 
creature in a non-cognitive triangular scenario – can have the status of necessary conditions 
for thought at all in fact depends on there being a sufficient condition that supports them. For 
it is only the reference to the intentional phenomenon itself that provides room to decide 
which of the many happenings in the world are such that they can account for an explanation 
of this very phenomenon. That is, in the end, sufficiency does indeed support necessity. It has 
to, given anti-reductionism.  
One would have to say more on this subject, of course. But what should be clear by now is 
that, given Pagin`s support of anti-reductionism, he has no good reasons to accuse Davidson 
of arguing in a viciously circular fashion.  
So far, the objection from circularity: As was said in the beginning, there are two objections 
left. Let’s take a look at the second, which holds that Davidson engages in empirical 
speculations too weak for his modal claim.7 This objection is mainly concerned with that part 
                                                
6 Pagin 2001: 205p. 
7 Bishop; Glüer, Pagin, Glock,  
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of the triangulation-argument aimed at showing that possessing the concept of objective truth 
is necessary for having thoughts.  
As we have seen, according to Davidson, in order for a creature to have beliefs it has to know 
that beliefs are things that can be true or false independent of the creature’s performing them. 
That is, a creature with beliefs must have the concept of objective truth. To attain this concept, 
however, a social setting such as the triangular scenario is required. For only a social setting, 
Davidson holds, can provide the contrast necessary for determining reactions as deviant, 
which, in turn, creates space for the application of the concept of truth. To be sure, 
triangulation is not supposed to determine truth-conditions. Its purpose is the enabling of 
content-determination, and as such it is a condition for thoughts having determinate content, 
given, of course, that the social setting consists in linguistic interaction. “The point is not to 
identify the norm, but to make sense of there being a norm.” (2001 “Externalisms”: 7) 
Now, it seems that the argumentative status of the triangulation-scenario in this case differs 
from its status for content-determination. For, Davidson asks: “Where do we get the idea that 
we may be mistaken, that things may not be as we think they are?” (2001 (1997): 129) and 
provides the following answer: “If you and I can each correlate the other’s responses with the 
occurrence of a shared stimulus, however, an entirely new element is introduced. Once the 
correlation is established it provides each of us with a ground for distinguishing the cases in 
which it fails. Failed natural inductions can now be taken as revealing the difference between 
getting it right and getting it wrong, going on as before, or deviating, having a grasp of the 
concepts of truth and falsity.” (1994: 15)  
Davidson’s suggestion here seems to be that linguistic triangulation provides room for the 
acquisition of the concept of truth. That is, a certain causal history seems to be required for a 
creature to get the concepts of truth and falsity. If the creature were all by itself, there would 
be no chance whatsoever for the concept to occur. It thus seems that, contrary to the case of 
content-determination, the point Davidson is making here, is not conceptual but empirical, a 
fact he admits. “It certainly is speculation, and just as surely is not proven to be the sole 
source of our sense of objectivity.” (Comments on Karlovy Vary Papers, 293). But of course, 
as an empirical this argument is too weak for Davidson’s modal claim. After all, as Davidson 
himself admits, other ways of acquiring the concept of truth are at least thinkable. We can, for 
instance, think of a creature triangulating with an object in a world all by itself via different 
sensual modalities. In that case the object would be re-identified if the same reactions – for 
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instance eating – were possible.8 No second creature, not to speak of a language, would be 
needed.  
This second objection against Davidson, therefore, I think, convinces. 
What about the third and last, which aims at offering an empirical counterargument? This 
objection is mainly concerned with the Davidsonian claim that in order to think a creature 
must possess higher-order beliefs, like the concepts of truth, falsity and of belief. The idea is 
to render this claim implausible by providing evidence that there are creatures who are, on the 
one hand, able to think but, on the other hand, lack knowledge of the conditions of thought. 
Although prima facie an argument from analogy, this move is not subject to the criticisms 
mentioned in the beginning. For, it refers to individuals that quite obviously think, in that they 
fulfill the condition essential to thought, that is, they show sufficient linguistic capacities to 
count as speakers. What these people are said to lack partially or completely is the capacity to 
entertain higher-order thoughts. These individuals are people with autism.9  
It is said that one of the most characteristic features of people with autism – though possibly 
not the all-explaining cause – is their total or partial lack of a theory of mind. As Baron-
Cohen holds: “Some people with autism lack almost all signs of a theory of mind. (…) More 
commonly, people with autism have some of the basics of a theory of mind, but have some 
difficulties in using it at a level that one would expect, given their intelligence in other 
areas.”10 What is of interest for us is, of course, that these people talk, in fact on syntactically 
and phonologically quite sophisticated levels. They display generative capacities and master 
devices such as active-passive transformations.11 Problems, however, lie in the areas of 
semantics and especially pragmatics. While semantic problems usually are overcome12, the 
problems found in pragmatics remain. Accordingly, Happé showed that children with autism 
have difficulties in understanding figurative speech through story comprehension. Examples 
here include sarcasm, metaphor, and irony. And, later in their development, even as adults 
with university-degrees people with autism can hardly be said to have pragmatic 
conversational skills. For they lack many abilities such as being sensitive to other person’s 
contributions to the conversation, or recognizing what is the wrong or the right thing to say in 
a particular context.13 But still, these people talk. What they obviously lack to a partial or total 
degree is a theory of mind. That is, people with autism seem to lack the concept of thought. 
                                                
8 A suggestion of this kind can be found in Ruth Millikan, though she does not make use of the term 
“triangulation”.  
9 Glüer, Pagin, Andrews, Glock 
10 S. Baron Cohen, Autism and `theory of mind`, 3-4. 
11 Tager-Flugsberg 1985 
12 Lord 1985 
13 Andrews & Radenovic 2006: 670 ff. 
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This suspicion can be substantiated if we consider that children with autism show a 
substantial delay, both in chronological age and in verbal mental age (VMA), in developing 
the capacity to pass false-belief tests.14 And, what is more, people with autism who do pass 
Theory of Mind (ToM) tests such as the false-belief test nonetheless often fail to act as 
interpreters outside of the experimental setting. That is, “they are often unable to use their 
understanding of mental states in real life contexts.”15 Thus, it seems, the possession of the 
concept of belief does not co-evolve with the ability to speak, and therefore with the ability to 
think. Accordingly, the concept of belief does not seem to be a necessary condition for 
thought. This third objection, too, seems to be successful.  
However, we have to be careful here, as Hanni Bouma remarks.16 For there is another claim in 
Davidson, namely, that in order to be a speaker one has to be an interpreter and apply the 
principle of charity. This principle requires of an interpreter to attribute a largely coherent 
belief system to a speaker. In doing so, the interpreter has to consider, that some of the 
speaker’s beliefs might be mistaken, as well as the fact that not all beliefs are of the same 
importance. Observational beliefs, for instance, are more basic and thus more important to get 
it right than others. Thus, “applying the principle of charity explicitly involves judging the 
reasonableness of beliefs, which does require higher-order thought capacity.”17 Bouma`s 
remark, then, amounts to the following: if people with autism are speakers, they have to have 
the concept of belief, since as speakers they necessarily are interpreters, too.  
What are we to make of this? I think the answer should be twofold: on the one hand, Bouma 
is right. Since the principle of charity, in Davidson’s theory, is constitutive of something to 
have meaning at all, all linguistic communicators interpret by way of charity. Therefore, 
autistic people who talk have to use this principle in one way or another, too. On the other 
hand, there seem to be different ways of applying the principle of charity: a more 
sophisticated and a merely mechanical. The more sophisticated way requires interpreters to 
explicitly possess the concept of belief, like in communication situations with ironic 
utterances or metaphors. And here, as we have seen, people with autism fail. Yet, for a merely 
mechanical application of the principle of charity there is no such requirement. Here, for 
example in a learning situation, a stereotypical way of interpretation is sufficient. There is no 
need to know that the teacher has beliefs, not even to have a tacit knowledge of the teacher`s 
                                                
14 Happé 1995 
15 Happé 2000, 215. According to Andrews and Radenovic 2006 this is a reason to questioning the usefulnes of 
those tests. For, why should we credit a person with the concept of belief when she constantly fails to read 
intentions of others in ordinary social contexts, regardless of whether she passes ToM tests?  
16 H. Bouma, 2006: 679-690  
17 Glüer, Pagin 2003: 44. 
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having beliefs. The only thing that matters is to mechanically accept everything the teacher 
says.18  
Bouma`s remark, then, cannot unhinge the empirical counterargument. But still, it is not clear 
yet whether the autism-case really challenges Davidson. For, even if Davidson grants the 
possibility of mechanically applying the principle of charity and thus grants people with 
autism the complete or partial lack of a theory of mind he, nonetheless, does not seem 
committed to deny them the possession of the concept of belief. For, as long as someone 
knows that beliefs are things that can be true or false independent of a believer`s having them, 
he already possesses the concept of belief. That is, a creature only needs the concept of 
objective truth in order to count as having beliefs.19 This concept, however, many people with 
autism seem to have. For, many people with autism are able to recognize mistakes as mistakes 
and, in turn, are able to correct them.20  
Thus it seems that from the fact that people with autism may or do lack a theory of mind in 
that they are no fully developed Davidsonian interpreters who apply the principle of charity 
consciously, it does not necessarily follow that they have no concept of belief at all. For, there 
is still the concept of objective truth. And this concept seems to be possessed by many autistic 
people. People with autism, then, seem to fulfill all the conditions Davidson requires of 
thinking beings: they have a concept of belief, they interpret, if only mechanically, and they 
speak. 
Does this third objection to Davidson's argument from the concept of belief fail, then? I think 
it doesn’t fail. For, the crucial question is: how do autistic people arrive at the concept of 
objective truth? A prima facie answer would be: by way of mechanically interpreting the 
speech of another. As we have seen mere mechanical application of the principle of charity 
does not undermine its constitutive status for a theory of meaning. It is not necessary that all 
interpreters possess a theory of mind. As long as not all interpretation is merely mechanical, 
exceptions are easily adjusted by “ordinary” interpretation that explicitly makes use of the 
concept of belief. Thus, it seems that people with autism do not need to have a theory of mind 
in order to acquire the concept of objective truth. But this conclusion is too quick. For if we 
take the triangulation scenario seriously it follows that even the concept of objective truth can 
only be acquired via the possession of a theory of mind.  
As we have seen, according to Davidson the concept of objective truth can only be acquired 
by way of observing deviant reactions to one and the same object. However, in order for this 
                                                
18 See Glüer and Pagin 2003 
19 Thanks to Sanna Hirvonen for pointing this out to me. 
20 XXXXX 
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to be possible, an object of mutual reaction has to be determined as such, namely by way of 
linguistic interaction. That is, in order for the concept of objective truth to be attained, 
content-determination must have taken place. And content-determination consists in mutual 
knowledge of an object as the object of thought of an observed creature in a triangular 
situation. And this mutual knowledge requires communication. Thus, according to Davidson, 
the concept of objective truth is derivative. It derives from mutual knowledge of an object as 
the object of thought of an observed creature in a triangular situation. It thus derives from a 
theory of mind.  
Now, what people with autism lack – to a partial or complete degree – is exactly a theory of 
mind. And it seems that they don’t arrive at such a theory via a mere mechanical application 
of the principle of charity.21 But what many people with autism have is the concept of 
objective truth. This, however, suggests that there are other ways than the one proposed by 
Davidson through which the concept of objective truth can be acquired. Creatures need not 
have a theory of mind in order to possess the concept of objective truth.  
The autism-case thus supports the second objection held against Davidson. But there is even 
more to it. For the autism-case not only loosens the suggested connection between the 
possession of the concept of objective truth and a theory of mind, but – and more importantly 
– it also loosens the suggested connection between language and thought. This is so, because 
in the triangulation scenario language has the function of a condition of the possibility. 
Language is needed in order to acquire a theory of mind, that is, in order to find out the object 
an observed creature is thinking about. Now, as we have just seen, having a theory of mind is 
not necessary in order to be a thinking being, that is, in order to possess the concept of 
objective truth. Therefore, language as well is not necessary to think and to have the concept 
of objective truth.  
Thus, two of three objections raised against the argument from the concept of belief succeed. 
According to the second objection Davidson makes an empirical instead of a conceptual claim 
with regard to the acquisition of the concept of objective truth. Therefore, other ways of 
acquiring this concept, non-linguistic ways for example, or even solipsistic ways are very well 
conceivable. And indeed, there seems to be evidence for the existence of non-linguistic 
creatures that have the concept of objective truth. Pigs, for example, are shown to be able to 
recognize mistakes as mistakes.22  
That there are indeed other ways of arriving at the concept of objective truth is shown by the 
third objection. People with autism lack to a partial or total degree a theory of mind. 
                                                
21 Andrews & Radenovic 
22 Schweinebeispiel 
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Nonetheless many of them possess the concept of objective truth, and therefore are believers. 
But the autism-case shows even more, namely that, unlike Davidson claims, language does 
not seem to be necessary in order to have thoughts. For according to Davidson language is 
necessary for content-determination, because content-determination consists in mutual 
knowledge of an object the respective other in a triangular situation is thinking about. And 
this mutual knowledge is possible only through language. But since people with autism 
completely or partially lack this mutual knowledge, because they completely or partially lack 
a theory of mind, there is obviously no need for language. For autistic people do have the 
concept of objective truth. They know the difference between the world and thoughts about it. 
Thus they do think, which of course means that they do have thoughts with determinate 
content.  
So, only the first objection raised against Davidson failed. Although Davidson indeed argues 
in a circular fashion, this circle is not vicious. For an anti-reductionist has no other possibility 
to explain intentional phenomena but by using intentional vocabulary and thus by referring to 
the phenomena itself. But this is of no help for Davidson. For he wanted to show that 
language is necessary in order to have thoughts. And this, as we have seen, he didn’t show. 
There might indeed be creatures who have the concept of objective truth und thus know the 
difference between the world and thoughts about it, but who nonetheless do not speak a 
language.  
Therefore, there are good reasons, or to put it more modestly, we have two good arguments 
that help to indicate that the property of thinking might not constitute an anthropological 
difference.  
